摘要

随着我国建筑业转向高质量发展阶段，工程质量的地位和重要性日益显著。建设工程质量关系群众利益和投资效益，也是建筑业可持续健康发展的关键。目前，建设工程在实施阶段的质量问题仍然存在，这主要与三方责任主体的质量行为有关。施工单位的规范施工程度、建设单位和监理单位的监管力度决定了工程质量控制水平，而实际工程中不规范施工、监管不力等问题时有发生，导致工程质量控制水平低下，工程质量监管的效率和效果不容乐观。

组织是实现工程质量目标的决定性因素。在中国，建设单位、监理单位和施工单位是质量监管活动的三方责任主体。针对目前我国工程质量监管机制中各方质量责任难以落实的问题，本文首先提出基于进化博弈理论的建设工程质量监管系统动力学（SD）模型，从组织行为的角度分析三方责任主体质量行为选择的变化过程。其次构建基于计划行为理论（TPB）的监管行为影响因素模型，从个体行为的角度探讨建设单位质量管理人员监管行为的影响因素及其相关关系。研究结果表明：（1）初始状态下博弈过程不存在进化稳定策略；（2）监管成本和奖惩力度对建设单位监管率有较大影响；（3）动态奖惩策略可以有遏制博弈过程的波动性并提高优化模型的稳定性。结合工程实际来看，建设单位奖惩力度和监管成本对施工单位的质量行为有较大影响，在监理单位和施工单位存在现实勾结的情况下会导致监理单位监管失效并对建设单位的监管起反作用，实施动态奖惩机制能实现仅依靠建设单位的监管就能保证施工单位实施正常质量行为的目标。（4）行为态度和知觉行为控制通过监管意愿的中介效应间接作用于监管行为，是影响建设单位质量管理人员监管行为最显著的两个因素。

关键词：工程质量监管；质量行为；进化博弈；系统动力学；计划行为理论

Abstract

As the construction industry enters a stage of high-quality development, the construction quality is playing an increasingly greater role. The quality of construction is not only related to the people’s interests and investment benefits, but also the key to the sustainable and healthy development of the construction industry. At present, quality defects still exist in the construction phase, which are mainly affected by quality behavior of construction stakeholders. In fact, the degree of standard construction by the contractors and supervision by the owners and supervisors determine the level of construction quality control. However, problems, such as nonstandard construction and inadequate supervision, sometimes occur in practical construction projects, thus result in low level of project quality control. In general, the effect and efficiency of construction quality supervision effect and efficiency is not optimistic.

Organization is a critical factor to realize the quality objective of construction. In China, the project owner, construction supervising engineer and construction contractor are tripartite stakeholders in regard to quality management. To solve the organizational problems of quality supervision, two models were established to analyze the uncertainty about quality behavior option among tripartite stakeholders. Firstly, this paper proposed a system dynamics (SD) model based on evolutionary game theory to describe the interactions among the stakeholders in quality management. Research from an organizational behavior perspective focused on changes about quality behavior among stakeholders. Secondly, an influencing factor model of supervision behavior based on the theory of planned behavior (TPB) is built. From the angle of individual behavior, influence factors of supervision behavior and the relationships among them had been studied in the light of remarks from quality management staff working for diverse project owners. The results show that 1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in the initial interactions between the stakeholders; 2) two external variables (supervision cost, the degree of punishment and reward) changes of the owner have a great effect on the contractor’s rate variable; 3) the dynamic penalty-incentive scenario can effectively restrain the fluctuations and improve the stability of the proposed model. These results reflect the practical significance that the owner has a greater impact on the contractor in quality management. In addition, the supervisor fails to regulate and even has a negative effect on the owner’s supervision when it colludes with the contractor. What’s more, the dynamic penalty-incentive implementation can guarantee the contractor to achieve quality goals only under the supervision of the owner. 4) Subjective norm and perceived behavior control are the two most important determinants of supervision behavior and supervision intention plays a mediating role in the relation between the two factors and the behavior.

Keywords: construction quality supervision; quality behavior; evolutionary game; system dynamics; theory of planned behavior

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