【11月3日】 “WISE-SOE”2011秋季学期高级经济学系列讲座第九讲(总第181讲)——张岚博士
被阅览数：2334次 发布时间:2011/10/31 15:27:52
时 间：2011年11月3日（星期四）16：30—18：00
摘要：This paper studies a class of entry and price games in which firms differ in demand, entry cost and many other characteristics. Each firm’s entry and price strategies are determined simultaneously. Our analysis shows that the economic rent and lower price bound are the two key variables to focus on in the equilibrium analysis. Firm profits are maximized in an equilibrium where (a) not all firms participate in the competition; (b) while some firms use price promotions to attract comparison shoppers, other firms charge monopoly prices to extract the highest possible consumer surplus from their loyal consumers. The predictions of our model are consistent with entry and pricing behaviors observed on price comparison websites such as PriceGrabber.com.
